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Abstract: We propose a view of vagueness as a semantic property of names 
and predicates. All entities are crisp, on this semantic view, but there are, for 
each vague name, multiple portions of reality that are equally good candidates 
for being its referent, and, for each vague predicate, multiple classes of 
objects that are equally good candidates for being its extension. We provide a 
new formulation of these ideas in terms of a theory of granular partitions. We 
show that this theory provides a general framework within which we can 
understand the relation between vague terms and concepts and the 
corresponding crisp portions of reality. We also sketch how it might be 
possible to formulate within this framework a theory of vagueness which 
dispenses with the notion of truth-value gaps and other artifacts of more 
familiar approaches. Central to our approach is the idea that judgments about 
reality involve in every case (1) a separation of reality into foreground and 
background of attention and (2) the feature of granularity. On this basis we 
attempt to show that even vague judgments made in naturally occurring 
contexts are not marked by truth-value indeterminacy. We distinguish, in 
addition to crisp granular partitions, also vague partitions, and reference 
partitions, and we explain the role of the latter in the context of judgments that 
involve vagueness. We conclude by showing how reference partitions provide 
an effective means by which judging subjects are able to temper the 
vagueness of their judgments by means of approximations. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the proper name ‘Mount Everest’. This refers to some mereological whole, 
a certain giant formation of rock. A mereological whole is the sum of its parts, and 
Mount Everest certainly contains its summit as part. But it is not so clear which parts 
along the foothills of Mount Everest are parts of the mountain and which belong to 
its neighbors. Thus it is not clear which mereological sum of parts of reality actually 
constitutes Mount Everest. One option is to hold that there are multiple candidates, 
no one of which can claim exclusive rights to serve as the referent of this name. 
Each of these many candidates has the summit, with its height of 29,028 feet, as 
part. These candidates differ, however, regarding which parts along the foothills are 
included as parts of Mount Everest and which are not (see the right part of Figure 1). 
Consider, analogously, the predicate ‘is a bald male’. Bill Clinton certainly does 
not belong to the extension of this predicate, and Yul Brunner certainly does. But 
how about Bruce Willis? It would seem that there are some candidates for the 
extension of this predicate in which Bruce Willis is included, and certain others in 
which he is not.  
Varzi (2001) refers to the above as a de dicto view of vagueness. It treats 
vagueness not as a property of objects but rather as a semantic property of names 
and predicates. There are, for each vague name, multiple portions of reality that are 
equally good candidates for being its referent, and, for each vague predicate, 
multiple classes of objects that are equally good candidates for being its extension. 
There are some, for example Tye (1990), who are happy to include in their ontology 
vague objects and regions and thus defend a de re view of vagueness. In a 
quantitative formalism this might result in what Fisher (1996) calls fuzzy objects 
and regions. The important point is that on this de re view one needs to extend one’s 
ontology in such a way as to include new, special sorts of regions and objects in 
addition to the crisp objects and regions one has already recognized. This not only 
brings added ontological commitments but implies also that one needs to investigate 
the question whether vague location (of vague objects in vague regions) is or is not 
the same relation as the more familiar crisp location of old. 
Given the de dicto point of view there is no need to extend our ontology in this 
way. We need, rather, to reconceptualize the relationships between terms and 
concepts on the one hand, and crisp objects and locations out there in the world on 
the other. Such relationships are not one-one, but rather one-many, and we can think 
of their targets, tentatively, as multiple products of demarcation. Note that this 
reconceptualization is not intended as an account of what is involved cognitively 
when we use vague terms or predicates. Normal subjects in normal (which means: 
non-philosophical) contexts are not aware of the existence of such multiple targets. 
Rather, the simultaneous demarcation of a multiplicity of crisp referents or 
extensions takes place as it were behind the scenes. What we offer here is a proposal 
for dealing theoretically with the ontology of that particular type of links a cognitive 
subject to some correlated reality when vague terms or predicates are used. While it 
is not our primary purpose here to throw light on what the cognitive subject thinks is 
going on when using such terms or predicates, the fact that many of the matters with 
which we deal fall beneath the threshold of her concern is itself something which the 
theory of granular partitions is able to illuminate.  
The de dicto view of vagueness goes hand in hand with the doctrine of 
supervaluationism, which is based on a redefinition of the notion of truth to 
accommodate the multiplicity of candidate precisifications which the de dicto view 
sees as being associated with vague names or predicates. The basic idea is that, 
when determining the truth of an assertion containing a vague name or predicate, it 
is necessary to take into account all its candidate referents or extensions. In order to 
evaluate such an assertion semantically, we must effectively run through these 
candidates in succession and determine, for each particular choice, whether it makes 
the assertion true or false. An assertion such as ‘Yul Brunner was bald’ is supertrue 
because it is true for all such choices. An assertion such as ‘Bill Clinton is bald’ is 
superfalse because it is false for all such choices.  
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Figure 1: Left: a partition, with cells Everest, Lhotse and The Himalayas. Right: 
A part of the Himalayas seen from space, with Mount Lhotse (left) and Mount 
Everest (right). 
The problems arise in regard to sentences which are indeterminate, in the sense 
that they come out true for some choices and false for others. The core of these 
problems is captured in the so-called Sorites paradox (Hyde 1996). Consider Bill 
Clinton. He is certainly not bald, and losing one hair will not make him bald. This 
seems to hold quite generally: if Clinton is not bald and he loses one hair, then he is 
still not bald. Following this chain of reasoning if we start from a non-bald Clinton, 
then Clinton will still not be bald even if he has only 10 hairs left on his head. This 
is because, intuitively, losing one hair does not cause the transition to baldness. A 
similar chain of reasoning can be constructed in the case of Mount Everest. The 
summit is part of the mountain. If x is a part of a mountain, then every molecule that 
is connected to x is also part of the mountain. Following this chain of reasoning, we 
end up concluding that Berlin is part of Mount Everest. In this paper we will provide 
a framework for understanding how such chains of reasoning are broken in normal 
contexts of assertion.  
We shall concentrate our attentions in what follows on the case of singular 
reference, i.e., reference via names and definite descriptions to concrete portions of 
reality such as mountains and deserts, leaving for another occasion the task of 
extending the account to the case of vague predication. We shall concentrate 
primarily on spatial examples. As will become clear, however, it is one advantage of 
the framework here defended, that it can be generalized automatically beyond the 
spatial case. 
2. Judgments, Supervaluation, and Context 
2.1 Judgments and supervaluation 
As already pointed out above, supervaluation is based on a redefinition of the notion 
of truth to accommodate a multiplicity of possible referents. It draws on the 
recognition that a sentence can often be assigned a determinate truth-value 
independently of how the referents of its constituent singular terms are more 
precisely specified, or in other words, independently of how we might restrict such 
reference to just one (or just some few) of the many portions of reality which are 
candidate precisifications. A sentence is called supertrue, on this account, if and 
only if it is true (and superfalse if and only if it is false) for all such precisifications. 
If, on the other hand, it is true under some ways of precisifying and false under 
others, then it is said to fall down a supervaluational truth-value gap. Its truth-value 
is indeterminate. 
The technique of supervaluation evolved as part of standard model-theoretic 
semantic. Thus it has been studied primarily as it applies to formulae of artificial 
languages conceived in context-free fashion. As Smith and Brogaard (2001) point 
out, however, the degree and type of vagueness by which the singular terms of 
natural language are affected varies in significant ways according to the contexts in 
which such terms are used. They therefore argue that, if the supervaluationistic 
method is to be extended to natural language, then it will be necessary to 
contextualize the theory by conceiving semantic evaluations as being applied not to 
sentences but to the judgments which such sentences express. It is, after all, through 
judgments – sentences as used assertively in specific contexts – that terms are 
projected onto reality by the subjects who use them. 
It then transpires that the very same sentence may be used in 
different contexts to express distinct judgments even where the 
singular terms involved refer to what is intuitively the same parcel 
of reality. The supervaluations of the given judgments will then 
look very different, even though the sentences in question are, as 
syntactic objects, one and the same (Smith and Brogaard 2001).  
This context-dependence of vagueness has important consequences. For while it is 
easy to concoct examples of sentences neither supertrue nor superfalse when such 
sentences are treated out of context – much of the philosophical literature on 
vagueness is devoted to the discussion of examples of this sort – it is much less easy 
to find examples of such sentences when we confine ourselves to assertions which 
would naturally arise in the specific types of contexts which human beings actually 
inhabit. This is for reasons of pragmatics: such contexts have features which make it 
difficult if not impossible for judgments to occur within them which are marked by 
indeterminacy.  
2.2 Context dependence 
To get an idea of what we have in mind, consider the sentence: 
 [A] This cavity is part of Mount Everest,  
uttered by someone pointing to a small cave near the summit of the mountain. 
Certainly, if we conceive matters entirely in abstraction from all contexts, then there 
are some precisified referents of ‘Mount Everest’ which would make this sentence 
come out true, and others which would make it come out false. The sentence comes 
out true, for example, if we could allow precisifications of Mount Everest to be 
defined spatially, for example by means of a rule (R1) to the effect that it is a 
sufficient condition for x to be part of Mount Everest that x occupies a spatial 
location which lies within the convex hull of the mountain as depicted on relief 
maps. The sentence comes out false, on the other hand, for all precisifications which 
conform to another, no less attractive rule (R2), to the effect that if x is a part of a 
mountain above a certain minimal size, then x is made of rock.  
Different sorts of rules for determining allowable precisifications will now be in 
operation in different sorts of contexts. Imagine, for example, that the sentence [A] 
is uttered by a speleologist on commencing the exploration of the cave. For her the 
cave is certainly a part of Mount Everest; she uses rule R1 as a matter of course. 
Moreover, the fact that the cave is filled with air is in this context critical: if it would 
be filled with rock, it would not be a cave. When she uses [A] to express a judgment 
in her specific speleological context, then the resultant judgment is reasonably 
evaluated as true for all possible precisifications consistent with this context; and 
hence, as supertrue. 
Consider, on the other hand a geologist analyzing probes collected by drilling 
holes in the rock. For him, rule R2 is in operation: portions of Mount Everest are 
constituted out of rock in every case. Here we see in play the factor of pragmatics: 
the geologist would not use [A], or anything like [A], to make a judgment. Even the 
negation of [A], i.e., ‘This cavity is not part of Mount Everest’ is not judgeable in 
his geological context.  
Some sentences have the feature that they are judgeable only in certain 
exceptional contexts. Consider for example the sentence: 
 [A′]  This hole is part of my jacket. 
In most everyday contexts [A′] is simply not judgeable. And if it is judgeable (for 
example because the hole is a design feature of the jacket), then it comes out 
supertrue. 
Consider the following example: 
[B] This glass is empty, 
and contrast the behavior of this sentence in two distinct contexts. In the first, C1, it 
is used to express a judgment by a drunkard in a seedy bar just after taking the last 
sip of beer from his glass. In the second, C2, its negation is used to express a judgment by a hygiene inspector inspecting the same glass just a few seconds later. 
We have here two distinct judgments, which we can abbreviate loosely as: J1 = (B, 
C1) and J2 = (not-B, C2). J1 is supertrue, since the glass contains, on all 
precisifications, nothing left to drink. And J2 is supertrue also: the hygiene inspector 
sees all the bacteria inside the glass and on no precisification consistent with what 
she sees would the sentence [B] be evaluated as true.  
Judgments, to repeat, are always made in contexts. Hence, to evaluate a judgment 
as to its truth (supertruth) or falsehood (superfalsehood) is to evaluate that judgment 
in its context. A judgment is supertrue if and only if it is true under all contextually 
appropriate ways of putting members of the pertinent ‘many’ into the extensions of 
the corresponding terms; and analogously for superfalsehood. If a sentence is not 
judgeable in a given context, then in that context it does not even reach the point 
where it can serve as a proper object of supervaluation.  
Can a sentence be judgeable in a context and yet still be indeterminate as to its 
truth-value? It is this question with which we shall deal in what follows. The notion 
of ‘context’ is of course itself notoriously problematic. The primary advantage of 
our proposal here will lie in the fact that the framework we advance enables us to 
rephrase our question in a way which does not rely on the use of this problematic 
notion. 
3. Granular Partitions 
3.1 Foreground, Background and Granularity 
Our fundamental idea is that every use of language to make a judgment about reality 
brings about a certain granular partition. Already every act of singular reference 
and every act of perception effects a partition of reality into a foreground domain, 
within which the object of reference is located, and a background domain, which 
comprehends all the entities beyond. When one moves ones attention from this to 
that (for example from this chair to that table) then one brings about an ontological 
regrouping of foreground and background: objects in one’s environment that 
previously served as foreground are now in the background, while objects 
previously in the background are now advanced to the front.  
Sometimes there occurs not regrouping but what we might call ontological 
zooming. The hygiene inspector first sees the glass, which serves as foreground 
object of her attention; then she focuses more carefully on the tiny particles of soap 
and beer clinging to the walls of the glass. She sees the world first through a coarser 
and then through a finer grid.  
To produce an ontological theory of such partitioning, of ontological zooming 
and regrouping, will be somewhat tricky. This is because the results of partitioning 
are granular in every case, and this means that they cannot be understood along any 
simple mereological lines. For it is not as if one connected, compact (hole-free) 
portion of reality would be foregrounded or set into relief in relation to its 
surroundings in such a way that the latter – the background of our cognitive act – 
could itself be identified simply as the mereological complement of what is 
foregrounded. For if an object – say Leeds, or the ice cream in your hand – are 
included in the foreground domain, this does not at all imply that all the parts of this 
object are also included therein. For to say that partitions are granular is to say that 
they do not recognize parts beneath a certain size. The separate roads and buildings 
in Leeds are not foregrounded by the partition you create when you use the term 
‘Leeds’, for example, when planning your trip to England next month; the separate 
molecules of the ice cream are not foregrounded by the partition you create when 
you look down to the ice cream in your hand prior to eating. This means that the 
ontology of foreground and background structure is ontologically more complex 
than has hitherto been supposed. Simple mereology will not suffice (Bittner 1997). 
The complexity of the foreground/background structure has consequences also 
for the issue of vagueness. For it means that each partitioning of a portion of reality 
into foreground and background is compatible with a range of possible views as to 
the ultimate constituents of the objects in the foreground. The granularity involved 
in our partitioning activity effectively allows us to trace over the lower-level 
constituents of those objects which are set into relief. It is this very granularity 
which is thus in fact responsible for the vagueness of our terms and concepts, for it 
allows us to ignore questionable parts and thus also to ignore questions as to the 
precise boundaries of the objects with which we have to deal.  
The theory of granular partitions is advanced in our earlier papers (Smith and 
Brogaard to appear), (Bittner and Smith 2001), (Smith and Bittner 2001) as a 
solution to the problem of how to deal with granularity in a mereological 
framework. Granular partitions are defined as systems of cells conceived as 
projecting onto reality in something like the way in which a bank of flashlights 
projects onto reality when it carves out cones of light in the darkness. Consider, for 
example the simple partition of the Himalayas that is depicted in the left part of 
Figure 1 above. This partition contains cells labeled ‘Everest’ and ‘Lhotse’, together 
with one maximal cell labeled ‘the Himalayas’. These cells project onto different 
parts of that portion of reality that is depicted in the right part of Figure 1. They 
carve mountains out of a certain formation of rock. They do not do this physically, 
but rather by establishing fiat boundaries in reality, represented by the black lines in 
the right part of the figure. (Smith 1995), (Smith 2001), (Bittner and Smith 2001). 
Fiat boundaries are in a way like the boundaries of a light-cone that is projected 
during daylight. The fiat boundaries are there, but we cannot see them. Thus we 
have to use indirect means (for example maps and compasses and complex 
calculations) in order to discover where they lie. In some cases we may have good 
grounds for believing that we have crossed them. For example a sudden increase in 
slope may tell us that we have crossed the boundary of Mount Everest. In some 
cases fiat boundaries have become associated with suitable bona fide props, for 
example with systems of pegs or fences in reality. Surveying is about establishing 
relations between fiat boundaries and real, physical landmarks of these sorts. 
(Moffitt and Bouchard 1987), (Bittner 1999).  
The problematic nature of the cases which concern us here, however, lies in the 
fact that the fiat boundaries with which we have to deal are not in any determinate 
place, but exist rather as multiple systems of boundaries projected onto reality 
through cognitive acts of a range of different sorts. Vagueness is, on the de dicto 
view, entirely a matter of the fiat realm. Everything which exists in the bona fide 
physical world – the world as it is before we come along with our partitions and our 
fiat borders– is crisp. (We leave aside the problems which arise for this thesis at 
very small scales.) 
3.2 Judgments, Partitions and Contexts 
Judgments and partitions are closely related. Consider the judgments J1 = (B, C1) and 
J2 = (not-B, C2) referred to above. Corresponding to J1 and J2 are two partitions, Pt1 
and Pt2. Both contain cells labeled ‘glass’ and ‘beer’, similar to the cells in the 
partition in the left part of Figure 1. But Pt2 has in addition cells labeled ‘bacteria’, 
‘mold’, ‘chlorine’, and so forth. Moreover Pt1 and Pt2 do not differ only in their 
complement of cells; they differ also in the way the cells they share in common are 
projected onto reality. The cell labeled ‘beer’ in the drunkard’s partition projects 
(tries to project) onto drinkable amounts of beer. The corresponding cell in the 
partition of the hygiene inspector projects even onto amounts of beer that are visible 
only under a microscope. Reflecting on such examples reveals a way in which 
partitions, by means of their cell structure, can stand proxy for contexts in a theory 
of judgment designed to take account of the context-dependence of vagueness. The 
number and arrangement of cells within a partition and the ways in which these cells 
project onto reality – which means above all the granularity at which they are 
targeted upon objects in reality – serve as formally tractable surrogates for those 
features of contexts which are relevant to the understanding of vagueness as a 
semantic (de dicto) phenomenon. 
Let us return to our partition of the Himalayas. There are, we can now say, 
multiple equally good ways of projecting the cell ‘Mount Everest’ onto the 
corresponding formation of rock. Each is slightly different as regards the location of 
the mountain boundaries which are projected among the pertinent foothills. Each 
projection targets just one possible candidate precisification. Each has, in other 
words, an ontological correlate that is entirely crisp. Vagueness arises only because 
there is not one such admissible projection, but rather very many.  
4. A Theory of Granular Partitions: A Brief Outline 
4.1 Partitions as System of Cells  
The theory of granular partitions has two parts: (A) a theory of the relations between 
cells and the partitions in which they are housed, and (B) a theory of the relations 
between cells and objects in reality.  
Theory (A) studies the properties granular partitions have in virtue of the 
relations between and the operations performed upon the cells from out of which 
they are built. All such partitions involve cells arranged together in some grid-like 
structure. This structure is intrinsic to the partition itself; that is to say, it is what it is 
independently of the objects onto which it might be projected. As we shall see this 
part of the theory applies equally well to crisp as to vague partitions. 
The cells in a partition may be arranged in a simple side-by-side fashion, for 
example in our partition of the Beatles into John, Paul, George and Ringo. Cells 
may also be nested one inside another in the way in which, for example, the species 
crow is nested inside the species bird which is nested in turn inside the genus 
vertebrate in standard biological taxonomies. It is the possibility of this nesting 
which more than anything else distinguishes granular partitions as here understood 
from partitions in the more familiar mathematical sense (partitions generated by 
equivalence relations).  
We define the cell structure, A, of a partition, Pt, as a system of cells, z0, z1, …, . 
We write Z(z, APt) as an abbreviation for ‘z is a cell in the cell-structure A of the 
partition Pt’. We say that z1 is a subcell of z2 if the two cells are in the same cell 
structure and the first is contained in the latter, and we write z1 ⊆Α z2 in order to 
designate this relationship. In the remainder we omit subscripts wherever the context 
is clear. We then impose four axioms (or ‘master conditions’) on all partitions, as 
follows: 
MA1: The subcell relation ⊆ is reflexive, transitive, and 
antisymmetric. 
MA2: The cell structure of a partition is always such that chains of 
nested cells are of finite length.  
MA3: If two cells overlap, then one is a subcell of the other. 
MA4: Each partition contains a unique maximal cell.  
These conditions together ensure that each partition can be represented as a 
tree (a directed graph with a root and no cycles). 
4.2 Partitions in their Projective Relation to Reality  
Theory (B) arises in reflection of the fact that partitions are more than just systems 
of cells. They are constructed in such a way as to project upon reality. Intuitively, 
this projection corresponds to the way proper names project onto or refer to the 
objects they denote and to the way our acts of perception are related to their objects. 
(Projection is close to what philosophers call ‘intentionality’.) When projection is 
successful, then we say that the object targeted by a cell is located in that cell. We 
then write ‘P(z, o)’ as an abbreviation for: cell z is projected onto object o, and ‘L(o, 
z)’ as an abbreviation for: object o is located at cell z. Intuitively, being located in a 
cell is like being illuminated by a spotlight. That location is not simply the converse 
of projection follows from the fact that a cell may project without there being 
anything onto which it is projected (as a spotlight can cast its beam without striking 
any object). Because location is what results when projection succeeds, location 
presupposes projection. An object is never located in a cell in a partition unless as a 
result of the fact that this cell has been projected upon that object. This is the first of 
our master conditions for theory (B): 
 MB1 L(o, z) → P(z, o). 
Partitions are cognitive artifacts. Objects can come to be located in the cells of 
our partitions only if we have constructed cells of the appropriate sort and targeted 
them in the right direction. We then say that the partition in question is transparent 
to the corresponding portion of reality. We can formulate this condition of 
transparency as follows: 
MB2 P(z, o) → L(o, z).  
In what follows we shall assume conditions MB1 and MB2 as master conditions 
governing all partitions. Thus in the restricted context of this paper MB1 and MB2 
collapse to L(o, z) ↔ P(z, o). MB2 serves to guarantee that objects are actually 
located at the cells that project onto them. In a more general theory of granular 
partitions, MB2 will be weakened to allow misprojection, for example where an 
object is wrongly named or wrongly classified.  
In order to ensure that projection and location satisfy the intuitions underlying our 
spotlight analogy, we demand further that projection and location are functional 
relations, i.e., that every cell projects onto just one object and every object is located 
in just one cell: 
MB3  P(z, o1) and P(z, o2) → o1 = o2 
MB4  L(o, z1) and L(o, z2) → z1 = z2 
For partitions satisfying MB3, each cell is projected onto one single object. (One 
rather than two; there is no overcrowding.) For partitions satisfying MB4 objects are 
in every case located at single cells. Notice that this excludes the sort of redundancy 
which would be involved where a single partition would contain distinct cells (for 
example labeled ‘Mount Everest’ and ‘Chomlungma’) both projecting onto what is 
(modulo the factor of vagueness) the same formation of rock. Notice also that 
‘object’ here is used in a very wide sense, to include also scattered wholes. Thus a 
partition of the animal kingdom might involve a cell labeled cat which projects onto 
that object which is the mereological sum of all live cats. 
We will assume that partitions are complete in the sense that every cell projects 
onto at least one object, i.e., that there are no empty cells (no cells projecting 
outwards into the void): 
MB5 Z(z, A) → ∃o: L(o, z) 
Consequently, projection is a total function.  
Location, however, is typically a partial function. This is because human beings 
are not omnipotent in their partitioning power. Thus for any given partition directed 
towards some domain of concrete reality there will always be objects which its 
referential spotlights do not reach. Even where we have a partition whose domain is 
just one single object, we can assume that there will be parts of this object – atoms, 
or sub-atomic particles – onto which no cell is projected. (This, again, is what is 
meant when we say that partitions are ‘granular’.) In the context of this paper we 
will assume that the constraints MB1–5 are always satisfied, i.e., projection and 
location are always functional, and there are no empty cells. 
4.3 Recognizing and Preserving Mereological Structure 
Partitions reflect the basic part-whole structure of reality in virtue of the fact that the 
cells in a partition are themselves such as to stand in the relation of part to whole. 
This means that, given the master conditions expressed within the framework of 
theory (A) above, partitions have at least the potential to reflect the mereological 
structure of the domain onto which they are projected. And in felicitous cases this 
potential is realized. We write ‘p(z)’ to designate the object located in the cell z. By 
MB5, p(z) is always defined. We say that the cells z1 and z2 reflect the mereological 
relationship between the objects onto which they are projected if and only if the 
following holds: 
DR1 RS(z1, z2) ≡ z1 ⊂ z2 → p(z1) < p(z2)  
If z1 is a proper subcell of z2 in a given partition, then the object onto which z1 
projects is a proper part of the object onto which z2 projects. A partition reflects the 
mereological structure of the domain it is projected onto if and only if each pair of 
cells satisfies DR1, a condition we impose on all partitions, as follows: 
MB6: Z(z1, A) and Z(z2, A) → RS(z1, z2) 
It follows from MB6 that everything onto which a cell in a partition is projected is a 
part of that onto which the root-cell is projected. 
We demand further that granular partitions satisfy a constraint to the effect that if 
objects recognized by a given partition stand to each other in a relation of part to 
whole, then the cells in which these objects are located stand to each other in the 
subcell relation. We first of all define what it is for an object to be recognized by a 
partition: 
 
 DR2  R(o, A) ≡ ∃z: Z(z, A) and L(o, z), 
 
and we write ‘l(o)’ to designate the cell in which an object recognized by a given 
partition is located. We then set: 
 
 DR3  RS+(o1, o2) ≡ o1 < o2 → l(o1) ⊂ l(o2) 
 
We can now formulate the condition:  
MB6+: R(A, o1) and R(A, o2) → RS+(o1, o2), 
which asserts that all partitions are mereologically monotone. 
4.4 The domain of a partition 
Each partition has a certain domain, which we can define as that portion of reality 
upon which its maximal cell is projected. This is a certain mereological sum: it is, as 
it were, the total mass of stuff upon which the partition sets to work: thus it is stuff 
as it exists independently of any of the divisions or demarcations effected by the 
partition itself through its constituent cells. Since the scope of partition theory is so 
general, the domain of a partition may comprehend not only concrete particulars and 
their constituents (atoms, molecules, limbs, organs), but also groups or populations 
of individuals (for example biological species and genera, battalions and regiments, 
archipelagos and diasporas) and their constituent members. In some cases, for 
example when drawing gridded maps, we project the cells of our partitions 
deliberately onto regions of space. (A more general theory than the one advanced 
here might allow that even partitions of this last sort may have cells which are 
empty. For example they may fail to project onto any actual region of space, as in 
the case of a map of Middle Earth.) 
We can define the domain of a partition, D(Pt), simply as the object onto which 
its root cell is projected. By functionality of projection and location there can be 
only one such object. That every partition has a non-empty domain follows from 
MB5. We now can define a granular partition as a triple Pt = (A, P, L), where A is a 
system of cells such that MA1–4 hold and P and L are projection and location 
relations such that MB1–6+ hold for the relationship between the cell structure A and 
the portion of reality onto which it projects. 
5 Judgments 
A judgment is a pair J = (S, Pt) where S is a sentence and Pt is a granular partition 
(which stands proxy for the context in which the judgment is made). It will take us 
too far afield to provide a general partition-theoretic account of truth for judgments 
here (to include, for example, compound judgments and judgments expressed by a 
sentence involving non-referring singular terms). It will suffice for our purposes to 
provide brief treatments of one or two simple examples, which have been chosen for 
illustrative purposes. 
5.1 Judgments about mereological relationships 
Consider the left part of Figure 1, with its three partition cells labeled ‘The 
Himalayas’, ‘Everest’, and ‘Lhotse’. These labels are the partition-theoretic 
counterparts of (inter alia) the names we use in judgments. Consider the sentence 
‘Everest is part of the Himalayas’ uttered in the context represented by the partition 
Pt. This judgment is of the form ‘a stands in R to b’ where ‘a’ is replaced by 
‘Everest’ and ‘b’ is replaced by ‘the Himalayas’ and ‘R’ is replaced by the binary 
predicate ‘part-of’.  
Given a judgment J = (S, Pt), the relationship between S and Pt is provided by a 
labeling function which assigns the names of the objects referred to in S to cells of 
Pt = (A, P, L). We say that λ is a labeling relating the partition Pt to the sentence S if 
and only if the following holds:  
(1) λ maps the sentence S as a whole onto the root cell of the partition Pt;  
(2) λ maps proper names appearing in S to cells in A in such a way that each 
cell gets uniquely labeled and each name has a unique corresponding cell;  
(3) the co-domain of λ exhausts the cell-structure of Pt. 
Condition (1) ensures that the judgment as a whole has a well-defined scope, 
namely the domain of Pt. In the specific case of J1 = (S1, Pt), where S is the sentence 
‘Mount Everest is part of the Himalayas’ and  Pt is the partition shown in the left 
part of Figure 1. The sentence S1 as a whole is mapped by λ onto the root cell of the 
given partition. Condition (2) ensures, in conjunction with the assumption (MB5) 
that there are no empty cells, that each cell is uniquely labeled by a name contained 
in S. The association of partition cells to the names occurring in the corresponding 
judgment corresponds to our discussion of ontological regrouping above. The 
judgment J1 brings into the foreground Mount Everest, the Himalayas, and the part-
of relation which holds between them; it forces everything else, including Mount 
Lhotse, Leeds, Bill Clinton, the ice cream in your hand, into the background of our 
attentions. Condition (3) ensures that the corresponding partition contains the cells 
‘Everest’ and ‘The Himalayas’ but not a cell labeled ‘Lhotse.’ In this sense the 
labeling function always maps onto partitions that are minimal with respect to the 
sentence used in making the corresponding judgment. 
Imagine a partition similar to the one represented in Figure 1, but without the cell 
‘Lhotse’. Here we can establish a labeling function between S1 and Pt, but we need 
to acknowledge that the root cell has a special status in the following sense: the 
labeling λ maps both the sentence S1 as a whole and also the name ‘the Himalayas’ 
onto the root cell of the given partition. Consequently the inverse of λ is not a 
function. This does not however violate condition (2), since the latter demands only 
the unique correspondence between names and cells. Formally we demand: (i) λ is a 
total function on proper names in S; and (ii) the inverse of the restriction of λ to 
proper names in S, (λ|S)-1, is a total function in (A – {r(A)}). Note that the root cell is 
often not targeted explicitly by any name at all. 
We now say that a judgment of the form ‘a is part of b’ is true in the context 
represented by Pt if and only if  
(i) Pt represents a portion of reality in such a way that MA1–4 and MB1–
6+ hold;  
(ii) there is a labeling function λ with the properties specified above; and  
(iii) the cell labeled ‘a’ is a subcell of the cell labeled ‘b’ in the partition Pt.  
5.2 Judgments about spatial relationships 
Consider the judgment J2 = (S2, Pt2), with S2 = ‘Lhotse lies to the west of Everest’ 
uttered while discussing the location of mountains in the Himalayas. This we shall 
interpret as a judgment of the form ‘a is F’ where ‘F’ is identified with the predicate 
‘west of Everest’. We can then interpret J2 as a judgment to the effect that ‘Lhotse’ 
is a part of the mereological whole formed by the sum of all things that lie to the 
west of Mount Everest.  
Let Pt2 be the partition shown in  
Figure 2 which consists of three nested cells. The labeling function λ maps S2 
onto the root-cell, which projects onto the Himalayas. This reflects the fact that the 
judgment was uttered in the context of a discussion of the relative locations of the 
mountains of the Himalayas. The predicate ‘west of Everest’ is mapped onto the 
middle cell which is projected onto the mereological sum of all the parts of the 
Himalayas that are to the west of Mount Everest. Finally, the name ‘Lhotse’ is 
mapped onto the cell in the center, which projects onto Mount Lhotse. 
 
The Himalayas 
what is to-the-west-of-Everest 
Lhotse 
 
Figure 2: A partition corresponding to the judgment ‘Lhotse is to the west of 
Everest’. 
We can now regard the judgment ‘Lhotse is to the west of Everest’ as being of 
the more general form ‘a is F.’ We define a labeling, for judgments of this form, as 
follows. λ is a labeling relating the partition Pt to the sentence S = ‘a is F’ if and 
only if the following holds:  
(1) λ maps the sentence S as a whole onto the root cell of the partition Pt;  
(2) λ maps the subject term of S onto a unique cell zi in A;  
(3) the co-domain of λ exhausts the cell-structure of Pt. 
A judgment of the form ‘a is F’ is then true in the context represented by Pt if and 
only if 
(i) Pt is a partition of reality for which MA1–4 and MB1–6+ hold;  
(ii) there is a labeling function λ with the properties specified above; and 
(iii) the cell labeled ‘a’ is a subcell of the cell labeled ‘F’ in the partition Pt.  
 
5.3 The perspective of the semantic theorists and of the judging subject 
When discussing the truth of judgments in partition-theoretic terms, we must take 
two distinct perspectives into account: the perspective of the semantic theorist and 
the perspective of the judging subject. It is critical to carefully separate these two 
different views. 
The perspective of the semantic theorist considers the truth of a judgment in 
relatively abstract terms as a correspondence between language and reality. (We are 
attempting, in all of the above, to be consistent with the standard notion of truth as 
correspondence.) The judgment J = (S, Pt) is true if and only if there is labeling 
function of the appropriate sort linking S to the cells of the partition Pt, and a 
projection function linking these cells in turn to corresponding portions of reality. 
This is of course very preliminary, and the range of examples treated is meager in 
the extreme, but it will provide a sufficient basis for what follows nonetheless.  
The judging subject succeeds in making a true judgment because he is able to 
effect a separation of reality into foreground and background and to bring to bear a 
perspective on reality that has a certain appropriate granularity. Only as a result of 
these selective features of his attention is he able to establish a relation to reality of 
the sort that is required to make a true judgment.  
6. Vague Granular Partitions  
6.1 Vagueness of projection 
The core of the theory of granular partitions is presented in (Smith and Brogaard, to 
appear). Our paper (Bittner and Smith 2001) gives a formal account of the concepts 
of cell and projection. The present paper provides a formal account of the 
phenomenon of vagueness in partition-theoretic terms. 
When projection is vague, then (to pursue our earlier spotlight analogy) not only 
can you not see the fiat boundaries carved out by the projections, you can know only 
roughly where they lie. What this ‘roughly’ (‘vaguely’) means is explained from the 
de dicto point of view as follows. It is as if there were many overlapping portions of 
reality that are equally good candidates for falling within the light-cone of your 
flashlight. Thus there are many alternative ways in which fiat boundaries for Mount 
Everest might be carved out among its foothills. The judging subject knows roughly 
where they lie – above all he knows that they must include the summit – but he 
cannot see or measure them directly. And this is not merely an epistemological 
problem: thus it is not merely that we do not know the facts about where the 
boundary of the mountain lies. There are no facts that specify where this boundary is 
located. 
Partition theory enables us to understand how, through their use of terms and 
concepts, judging subjects effect corresponding demarcations on the side of objects 
in reality. What we as partition theorists need to do now is to show how the use of 
terms and concepts can effect not only crisp demarcations of reality – as in the case 
of postal districts and census tracts – but also vague demarcations, as in the case of 
mountains and deserts and unregulated wetlands. The extension of the theory of 
granular partitions is modeled on the supervaluationist understanding of vagueness, 
but it follows the contextualized version of supervaluation suggested in (Smith and 
Brogaard 2001). Where, in the crisp case, each partition is characterized by a single 
projection relation and a single location relation, in the vague case we need to give 
up the constraint that each partition is associated with a single projection/location 
relation. Theory (A) is unaffected by this change, but we will need to provide 
modified axioms for theory (B) in such a way that crispness is included as just one 
special case.  
6.2 Vague partitions  
A vague granular partition Ptv = (A, Pv, Lv)
 
is a triple such that A is a system of cells 
for which MA1-4 hold and Pv and Lv are classes of projection and location relations, 
with properties which will be discussed below. Consider Figure 3, which depicts a 
vague partition PtV
 
= (A, Pv, Lv) of the Himalayas. This has a cell structure A, as 
shown in the left part of Figure 3, which is in fact identical to the corresponding part 
of Figure 1. In the right part of the figure, in contrast, there is a multiplicity of 
possible candidate projections for the cells in A, indicated by boundary regions 
depicted via cloudy ovoids. The boundaries of the actual candidates onto which the 
cells ‘Lhotse’ and ‘Everest’ are projected under the various Pi in Pv are included 
somewhere within the clouds of regions depicted in the figure. 
 Everest Lhotse 
The Himalayas 
 
Figure 3: A vague partition of the Himalayas 
The projection and location relations in these classes form pairs (Pi, Lj), which are 
such that each Pi has a corresponding unique Lj and vice versa, satisfying the 




 ∀j: Lj(o, z) → ∃!i Pi(z, o) 
MB2V  ∀i: Pi(z, o) → ∃!j: Lj(o, z) 
In the context of this paper MB1V and MB2V can be simplified as: ∀i∃!j: Pi(z,o) ↔ 
Lj(o,z).  
We also demand that all Pi and all Lj are functional in the sense discussed in the 
crisp case: 
MB3V  Pi(z, o1) and Pi(z, o2) → o1 = o2 
MB4V  Lj(o, z1) and Lj(o, z2) → z1 = z2 
We demand further that cells project onto some object (are non-empty) under every 
projection:  
MB5V Z(z, A) → ∀j ∃o: Lj(o, z) 
The modified versions of the axioms enforcing the preservation of mereological 
structure and mereological monotony for the pairs (Pj, Li) satisfying MB1V and 
MB2V then read: 
MB6V  Z(z1, A) and Z(z2, A) → ∀i RSi(z1, z2) 
MB6+V  Ri(A, o1) and Ri(A, o2) → RSi+(o1, o2),  
with definitions  
DR1V RSi(z1, z2) ≡ z1 ⊂ z2 → pi(z1) < pi(z2) 
DR2V  Ri(o, A) ≡ ∃z: Z(z, A) and Li(o, z) 
DR3V  RSi+(o1, o2) ≡ o1 < o2 → li(o1) ⊂ li(o2) 
We call all partitions Ptij = (A, Pi, Lj) with pairs (Pi, Lj) satisfying MB1−MB6+ 
crispings of the vague partition PtV. The domain of a vague partition is the 
mereological sum of the domains of all crispings. From MB5V it follows that the 
domain of each crisping is non-empty, i.e., ∀i, ∃o: o = D(Pti). 
Consider a partition with cells labeled with vague proper names. Intuitively, each 
pair of projection and location relations (Pi, Lj) then recognizes exactly one 
candidate precisified referent for each such cell. The precise candidates carved out 
by each (Pi, Lj) are all slightly different. But each is perfectly crisp and thus it has all 
of the properties of crisp partitions discussed in the previous sections. This means 
that, even under conditions of vagueness, the principal properties of partitions are 
preserved. Note that the vague partition PtV has just one single system of cells but 
many projection and location relations. The one system of cells projects in multiple 
ways onto reality. Each of the projections and each of the corresponding location 
relations behaves as it would in a standard, crisp partition.  
We can now consider two pairs of projection and location relations, (Pi, Lj) and 
(Pm, Ln), both satisfying MB1V–6+V. We then have two distinct crisp partitions Ptij = 
(A, Pi ,Lj) and Ptmn = (A, Pm, Ln). The cell structure is identical in both cases; both 
have the same minimal cells, ‘Mount Everest’ and ‘Mount Lhotse’, contained in the 
same maximal cell ‘the Himalayas’. In both cases these cells project onto 
neighbouring formations of rock, which are disjoint in the sense that ¬∃x: x = 
Pi(‘Everest’) * Pi(‘Lhotse’) and ¬∃x: x = Pm(‘Everest’) * Pm(‘Lhotse’), where ‘*’ 
signifies mereological intersection. (That such disjointness should hold for each 
projection relation is a penumbral condition in the sense of Fine (1975).) Again, it is 
important to recognize that the presence of vagueness does not mean that any of our 
conditions governing partitions are violated. Vagueness de dicto is captured at the 
partition level via multiple ways of projecting crisply. Each of these ways of 
projecting crisply must satisfy the conditions on partitions set forth above. 
6.3 Judgments and vagueness 
We can now define the notions of supertruth, superfalsehood, and indeterminacy for 
judgments, J = (S, PtV) with respect to a vague partition PtV
 
= (A, PV, LV). We 
assume that the cell structure A satisfies MA1–4 and that all of its crisp Ptij = (A, Pi, 
Lj) are such that MB1V–6+V hold. A judgment J is then supertrue with respect to a 
vague granular partition Ptv
 
if and only if it is true with respect to all of the crisp 
partitions Ptij = (A, Pi, Lj). A judgment J is superfalse with respect to Ptv if and only 
if it is true with respect to none of the crisp partitions Ptij = (A, Pi, Lj). It is 
indeterminate
 otherwise.  
As in the crisp case we need to take into account both the perspective of the 
semantic theorist and the perspective of the judging subject. The former is reflected 
in our use of a contextualized supervaluationary semantics, which captures those 
features of the matters in hand which fall beneath the threshold of awareness of the 
judging subject. As to the latter we note first of all that, as in the crisp case, 
important aspects of judging are the separation of reality into foreground and 
background of attention and the fact that judgments about reality are made at a 
certain level of granularity.  
7. Unity and vagueness 
7.1 Unity conditions 
When making a judgment to the effect that a is part of b, you apply a unity condition 
which provides you with the means to determine which parts of reality are to form a 
certain whole. We shall see that the study of the vagueness of judgments of the form 
JV = (‘a is part of b’, PtV) is closely related to questions of the vagueness of unity 
conditions.  
When recognizing wholes as sums of parts, judging subjects draw upon unity 
conditions that specify what sums of parts they are concerned with. In the case of 
Mount Everest, the pertinent unity condition might be formulated, in first 
approximation, along the following lines:  
U1 (1) The summit is part of Mount Everest. (2) If x is a part of Mount 
Everest and y is connected to x then y is a part of Mount Everest.  
We can assume for present purposes that clause (1) is unproblematic. Not so for 
clause (2), however, for this makes the unity condition incapable of determining 
which outlying portions of reality are parts of the mountain and which are not. It is 
because of this that paradoxes of the Sorites type can arise. U1 has the structure of 
an inductive definition. It specifies a start condition and a condition on how to add 
parts to Mount Everest, but it does not specify where to stop adding parts. This 
means that if we take (1) and (2) in U1 as true premises, then it is logically sound to 
infer that portions of reality are parts of Mount Everest that clearly fall outside it.  
We cannot simply dismiss U1. Clause (2) captures the continuous structure of the 
formation of rock to which the concept mountain applies, that is, it captures the fact 
that mountains are never scattered wholes; they are always such that we can form 
chains of connected parts a1, a2, a3, … But what determines the outer limits of such 
chains? Where does the mountain stop? As will by now be clear, there is no 
generally applicable and context-independent stop condition that can be inferred 
from a general concept such as mountain. 
Consider now the relationship between the unity condition U1 and a judgment of 
the form JV = (‘a is part of Everest’, PtV). The two are closely related in the following 
sense: U1 governs the way PtV projects onto reality in the sense that the cell 
‘Everest’ must project onto a topologically connected whole (clause (2) of U1) 
which contains the summit (clause (1) of U1). On the other hand judgment JV in the 
context represented by PtV also places limits on the range of admissible 
precisifications in the sense that it projects boundaries onto reality which serve to 
break the unlimited chains in the needed fashion. The problem is that these limits, 
i.e., the projected boundaries, are themselves subject to vagueness, and it is this 
which threatens the possibility of truth-value indeterminacy. Our task will be to 
show how this possibility is prevented from becoming actual in natural contexts, and 
thus to show that even judgments expressed by sentences involving vague terms 
have determinate truth-values. 
To this end, we need to discuss the range of relevant kinds of contexts. Two cases 
in particular are of importance, distinguished by the kinds of boundaries that can 
provide stop conditions of the needed sort:  
1. Contexts in which our use of the corresponding term brings a single 
crisp boundary into existence. 
2. Contexts in which our use of the corresponding term brings a vague 
boundary (i.e., a multiplicity of crisp boundary candidates) into 
existence. 
7.2 The single (crisp) boundary case 
Contexts of the first type are illustrated by those cases where judging subjects 
themselves have the authority (the partitioning power) to bring a crisp boundary into 
existence. Suppose that you have been delegated by some government agency to 
establish the boundaries of Mount Everest for purposes of regulating the activities of 
climbers. Your partition – we can imagine that it is set forth in some document D – 
would then come very close to being fully crisp, i.e. only one single projection 
relation would be involved, and the boundary of Mount Everest would in relevant 
contexts coincide with the boundary imposed by you. This has the consequence that, 
in the given contexts, the incomplete unity condition that comes with the underlying 
general concept is completed contextually, as follows: 
U2 (1) The summit is part of Mount Everest. (2) x is part of Mount 
Everest if and only if: (i) there is some y which is part of Mount 
Everest and x is connected to y, and (ii) x is part of the projection 
of the cell labeled ‘Everest’ in the partition determined by the 
document D. 
U2 has the advantage of blocking the admission of unlimited chains of connected 
parts. Moreover U2 still enforces the continuity of parts of the mountain in the spirit 
of U1. Using U2 the truth-value of a judgment of the form J = (‘a is part of Mount 
Everest’, Pt) is fixed in a determinate manner for each a, and truth-value 
indeterminacy cannot arise.  
7.3 The multiple (vague) boundary case 
Contexts where judging subjects have the authority and the need to bring a precise 
boundary into existence are, it must be admitted, very rare. Fortunately however 
there is in most contexts no need for the high degree of precision which such 
contexts represent. In most contexts, that is to say, we get along with a created 
boundary that is just precise enough. This means that it is precise to the degree to 
which it matters where it lies, and therefore also just precise enough to enable the 
judging subject to make a determinate judgment. In most cases, therefore, it will 
manifest a certain degree of vagueness, and the actual degree of vagueness (or the 
degree of precision) will depend on context. Where vagueness is involved 
indeterminate cases threaten to arise. To this end we must show, following (Smith 
and Brogaard 2001), that in naturally occurring contexts where boundaries are just 
precise enough, sentences which would have indeterminate truth-values are 
unjudgeable. 
In instructing your staff to set up the tables in your restaurant each evening, you 
establish where the line between smoking and non-smoking zones is to be drawn by 
using a sentence like: 
[C] The boundary of the smoking zone goes here, 
while pointing with your finger in such a way to bisect the restaurant floor. You 
thereby also indicate on which tables the ashtrays are to be placed. You specify 
vaguely where the boundary lies. This means that, with your vague gesture ,you 
bring a whole multitude of equally good boundary-candidates into existence.  
Our concept of a smoking zone is, after all, one of a whole with boundaries which 
are not precisely defined by sharp lines, fences, or walls. This is reflected by a unity 
condition along the lines of U3: 
U3 x is part of the smoking zone if and only if x is part of one 
of a multitude of equally good smoking-zone-candidates 
that were brought into existence by your initial 
specification of the boundary location . 
U3 like U2 has the advantage of blocking the unlimited chains of connected parts. 
The question then arises whether a judgment of the form J = (‘This table is part of 
the smoking zone’, PtV) can be such as to have an indeterminate truth-value. 
Inspection reveals that the apparent vagueness of the boundary-specification does 
not affect the determinacy of those judgments which judging subjects such as the 
restaurant staff or customers might actually make. Whether an ashtray is or is not 
placed on a table is, after all, a completely determinate matter. To capture the 
pragmatic constrains on judgeability in the given context, U3 needs to be revised in 
such a way that it does not admit arbitrary parts but only parts of certain size: 
U4 x is part of the smoking zone if and only if: (1) x is 
greater than or equal to one table in size; and (2) x is part 
of one of a multitude of equally good smoking-zone-
candidates that were brought into existence by the initial 
specification of the boundary location. 
In addition, U4 gains a twin, which determines the analogous condition for 
parthood in relation to the non-smoking zone which is its (partition-
theoretic) complement: 
U4′ x is part of the non-smoking zone if and only if: (1) x is 
greater than or equal to one table in size; and (2) x is part 
of one of a multitude of equally good non-smoking-zone-
candidates that were brought into existence by the initial 
specification of the boundary location. 
The vagueness of your specification of the location of the boundary of the smoking 
area does not affect the determinacy of the truth-value of the judgments made in the 
resultant context. U4 ensures that judgments of the form of J are either supertrue or 
superfalse. It also ensures that a judgment of the form ‘This nicotine molecule is part 
of the smoking zone’ cannot be uttered in the given context, since the unity 
condition U4 does not admit molecules as parts of smoking (or non-smoking) zones. 
A judgment of this form reflects an illegitimate mixing of granularities. If judgments 
of the given form are to be judgeable, then more precise specifications of the 
relevant boundaries would needed to be made by those involved, and this would 
mean creating a new context. 
8. Degrees of Vagueness and Crispness 
We can see that the achievement of an appropriate degree of vagueness or crispness 
within given naturally occurring contexts is critical for avoiding truth-value 
indeterminacy. In this section we discuss a range of examples which further 
strengthen this point.  
Imagine two neighboring countries, one with the death penalty and one without. 
Even if the border between the two countries is fiat in nature (no wall, no fence), 
still, if you murder somebody on one side of the border you will be liable to die, and 
if you commit your crime on the other side of the border you will be liable to go to 
jail. Here it does not seem that indeterminacy can arise. This will hold even if you 
commit the crime while your body spans the border of the two countries (a one-
dimensional fiat spatial entity, whose location can nowadays be determined with 
considerable accuracy). This is because, since this is the sort of case where your 
exact location relative to the boundary matters to the proceedings of the courts, 
these courts will themselves have developed mechanisms to remove indeterminacy 
by fiat from their judgments in light of the fact that the same person cannot both be 
hanged, and not hanged, for the same crime.  
Imagine that you are wandering across the desert somewhere in the borderlands 
between Libya and Egypt pointing towards a grain of sand on the ground, and that 
you pronounce the sentence: 
[D] This grain of sand belongs to Egypt. 
No corresponding judgment will have been made, according to the view we are here 
defending. This is the case not because the specification of the boundary between 
Libya and Egypt is vague. Rather, it is because speaker and audience would not take 
the given sentence seriously as expressing a judgment, because again, it reflects an 
illegitimate mixing of granularities. 
If, on the other hand, the need to determine the ownership of every grain of sand 
were to arise (for example because sand has become more valuable than gold), then 
means would be devised – and new sorts of contexts created – which would allow 
the corresponding judgments to be made and their truth-to be determined, at least in 
principle, unequivocally. For so long as this is not the case, however, there is no way 
to determine the truth-value of a judgment like [D]. Consequently, too, any attempt 
to make a judgment of this kind in our present contexts must fail on pragmatic 
grounds. 
Imagine that you are with a party of climbers somewhere in the foothills of 
Mountain Everest and that one of your number, pointing to some imaginary line on 
the ground, uses the sentence: 
[E] This is the boundary of Mount Everest 
in order to make a judgment. We argue that in the given context (a context in which 
it is obvious to all parties that there is no law or treaty which establishes where, in or 
around its foothills, the boundary of the mountain lies) someone using [E] would not 
succeed in making a judgment. Rather, he would be seen as making some sort of 
joke. This is because a judgment J = (D, Pt) of this form would invoke a crisp 
partition Pt = (A, P, L), and it is pragmatically impossible to invoke crisp partitions 
in contexts where both speaker and audience know that vague partitions are the best 
that can be achieved. Corresponding attempts to make judgments will not be taken 
seriously.  
It is, though, possible to conceive of contexts in which it is necessary to refer to 
the boundary of Mount Everest no matter how vague it might be. Suppose you make 
a judgment of the form: 
[F] We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest within the next hour.  
The admissible candidate boundaries for Mount Everest are hereby delimited as 
falling within a certain range, projected out onto the path ahead and determined as a 
function of travel time (all under the assumption that the judgment in question is 
true).  
In this case you, as judging subject, do not care where precisely the border is 
crossed because you are aware that you yourself are in a sense creating this border. 
The judgment concerns the approximate location of a boundary which has no legal 
or other formal status beyond that which is intended by you in the given context. 
The way in which the location of the boundary is specified is then once again just 
precise enough: it is such that it can be crossed within the next hour. It is then easy 
to see how your judgment might be either supertrue or superfalse. It is supertrue if, 
after a few minutes, you embark on a steep rise, which continues uninterrupted until 
you reach the summit. It is superfalse if you discover (or could discover), two hours 
after making your judgment, that you were over-optimistic: a new, wide valley 
suddenly appears between you and the mountain.  
The crucial question is: under what conditions might the given judgment be 
indeterminate in truth-value? Bear in mind that there is here no crisply pre-
established boundary; it is you the judger who determines – roughly – where the 
boundary lies. Can you determine that the boundary will be located in such a way as 
to dissect the family of admissible precisifications associated with the judgment you 
express by [F] into two disjoint sub-families, the first crossable within the hour, the 
second not? We think not. There is here only just enough precision. The necessary 
degree of precision to give rise to indeterminacy is not available.  
9. Boundaries limiting vagueness 
We argued that sentences containing vague names need to be considered as vehicles 
for judgment and thus that they must be analyzed semantically in the contexts in 
which they are actually used. Our overarching project is to show that, when 
considering judgments in their contexts, indeterminacy of truth-value is at least a 
much rarer phenomenon than is commonly supposed. Another large family of 
contexts must now be considered, they are contexts which involve the specification 
of constraints that delimit the range of admissible candidates. These are contexts 
which allow judgers to impose boundaries onto reality that resolve or at least limit 
the vagueness of their acts of reference. Thus in this section we focus on the judging 
subject and on his role in delimiting the degree of vagueness of his judgment by 
imposing fiat boundaries onto reality. 
9.1 Vagueness and approximation 
How do judging subjects impose boundaries vaguely? Consider judgment [F]: ‘We 
will cross the boundary of Mount Everest within the next hour’. This judgment 
specifies a range of admissible candidates by using the phrase ‘cross … within the 
next hour’. The judging subject thereby delimits the range of admissible candidates. 
Consider the left part of Figure 4. Boundaries delimiting admissible candidates are 
imposed by specifying a time interval that translates to travel distance along a path – 
time serves here as frame of reference. The boundaries are defined by the current 
location of the judging subjects (marked: ‘now’) and their location after the 
specified time has passed (marked: ‘in one hour’). Boundaries of admissible 
candidates of reference cross the path between these two boundaries. In general we 
call the first boundary the exterior boundary and the second the interior boundary. 
Exterior and interior boundaries are imposed onto reality by judging subjects in a 
process we call approximation.  
In the process of approximation the judging subject projects a granular partition 
onto reality. This granular partition serves as frame of reference in terms of which 
the judging subject is able to both specify and constrain the range of admissible 
candidates of vague reference. In being projected onto reality this granular partition 
imposes fiat boundaries that limit the vagueness of reference in the sense discussed 
above in the context of judgment [F]. In the examples shown in Figure 4 the cell-
structure of the partition serving as frame of reference (the reference partition) 
consists of three cells that are labeled ‘exterior’ and ‘core’ (projecting on the path 
left of ‘in one hour’ in the left part), and ‘where-the-boundary-candidates-are’. The  
cell exterior then projects onto the path west of ‘now’ in the left part of the figure, 
the cell core projects onto the path east of ‘in one hour’ and the cell where-the-
boundary-candidates-are projects onto the region enclosed by the two boundaries.  
Consider the sentences: ‘We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest in the next 
ten seconds’ and ‘We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest in the next 10 
years’. Both sentences are certainly not judgeable in most naturally occurring 
contexts. In the first case this is because the specified range of admissible candidates 
is much too fine, in the second case because it is much to coarse. We will discuss the 
relationships between degree of vagueness (the higher the degree of vagueness the 
larger the range within which admissible candidates occur) and the specification of 
constraints on the range of admissible candidates in more detail below. For now it is 
sufficient that the degree of vagueness and the specification of constraints on the 
range of admissible candidates need to be of compatible scale in the sense sketched 
above. In the remainder we consider constraints on the range of admissible 
candidates that are compatible with the degree of vagueness in force in a given 

















Figure 4: Boundaries that limit vagueness 
9.2 Higher-order vagueness 
In a slightly more complex case, the boundaries that are imposed to delimit the 
vagueness of the reference of a judging subject are of the sort illustrated by the 
sentence: 
 
[G]  We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest not earlier than 60 
minutes and not later than 90 minutes from now 
Here there is created a zone within which all the various admissible candidate 
boundaries must lie. 
This phenomenon is extensively discussed in the literature, e.g. (Cohn and Gotts 
1996), (Clementini and Felice 1996), (Roy and Stell to appear), but it raises the 
problem of higher-order vagueness. For when considered in a context-free manner, 
the exterior and interior boundaries are themselves subject to vagueness. We 
hypothesize, again, that when contexts are taken into account, and when we restrict 
our attentions to naturally occurring contexts, then this higher-order vagueness is, 
not indeed eliminated, but at least constrained in such a way that truth-value 
indeterminacy of judgments cannot arise. 
In order to support this hypothesis we need once more to consider the range of 
possible cases in which a judging subject establishes an object-boundary from 
scratch by specifying constraints on the possible location of the boundaries of 
admissible candidates. There are two fundamentally different ways in which this 
might occur: 
(1) Existing bona fide or fiat boundaries are re-used, as for example in the case 
where someone judges ‘Ohio is north of the Ohio river’. 
(2) New fiat boundaries are imposed, as for example in the case where someone 
judges ‘We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest within the next hour’. 
We shall discuss each of these in turn. 
9.3 Re-using existing boundaries 
There is one crisp granular partition with which we are all familiar. It has exactly 50 
cells, which project onto the 50 constituent states of the United States of America. A 
fragment of this partition is presented in the left and right parts of Figure 5. In the 
foreground of the figure we see in addition an area of bad weather, represented by a 
dark dotted region that is subject to vagueness de dicto in the sense discussed above. 
Wherever the boundaries of this object might be located, they certainly lie skew to 
the boundaries of the relevant states. But the figure also indicates (with the help of 
suitable labeling) that there are parts of the area of bad weather that are also parts of 
Wyoming, others which are parts of Montana, others which are parts of Utah, and 
yet others which are parts of Idaho.  
In the sorts of contexts (represented by more or less coarse-grained partitions) 
which we humans normally inhabit, it is impossible to refer to any crisp boundary 
when making judgments about the location of a bad weather region of the sort 
described. However it is possible to describe its (current) location relative to the 
underlying US-state partition. We, the judging subjects, then deliberately employ 
this partition as our frame of reference and we describe the relationships that hold 
between all admissible referents of the vague term ‘area of bad weather’ and the 
cells of this partition. In terms of spatial relations this means in the given case that 
all admissible candidates partially overlap the states of Wyoming, Montana, Utah, 
and Idaho and that they do not overlap any other state. Consequently, if a judging 
subject can specify for every partition cell a unique relation that holds for all 
admissible candidate referents of a vague term, then this is a determinate way to 
effect vague reference. A meteorologist may use a finer approximation, which 
means that she will employ a finer-grained partition as frame of reference in order to 
make a more specific judgment about the current location of the bad weather region. 
Thus she might use cells labeled Eastern Idaho, Southern Montana, Western 
Wyoming, and Northern Utah, and so on. The latter yield a fiat boundary of the sort 
depicted in the right part of Figure 5.  
Notice that all these boundaries existed already before the judgments which use 
them as frame of reference were made. They are only re-used in order to formulate 
constraints on the possible location of admissible candidates of the correspondingly 
vague referring term. Judging subjects re-use existing boundaries in this way in 
order to make determinate judgments about approximate locations. They do so 
because this is a convenient and determinate way to make vague reference, and it 
has even greater utility when the frame of reference is a commonly accepted one, as 
in the present case. It is important to see, again, that frames of reference are chosen 
in natural (normal) contexts in such a way that there is no truth-value indeterminacy 
in judgments effecting vague reference.  
        
Figure 5: States of the United States with a bad weather system  
Consider now the issue of higher-order vagueness, i.e., the question whether or not 
the boundaries re-used in order to delimit vague reference are subject to vagueness 
themselves. If the boundaries re-used by a judging subject are of the bona-fide sort – 
if, that is, they are boundaries in physical reality – then they are crisp by definition, 
at least at those levels of granularity pertinent to everyday human behavior. 
A first examination of the example above shows that the boundaries in a frame of 
reference like that determined by the states of the United States, too, are crisp. One 
can see easily that there are many frames of reference that impose crisp boundaries 
in the same sense and that such boundaries are re-used in judgments by judging 
subjects in the way discussed above. 
There are, however cases where the boundaries that are re-used are not crisp (i.e. 
where the boundaries in question are a multiplicity of crisp boundaries). Consider 
the judgment 
[H] The path taken by the whales follows the Gulf Stream.  
Obviously both ‘the path taken by the whales’ and ‘the Gulf Stream’ are vague 
terms, and no less obviously the vague reference of the latter constrains – if only 
vaguely – the range of admissible candidate referents of the former. But are there 
contexts in which [H] expresses a judgment whose truth-value is indeterminate? 
Again, we think not. Precisely because the judging subject avoids imposing crisp 
boundaries it is impossible to construct cases of truth-value indeterminacy, since 
once again: the requisite degree of precision is here not available for use on the level 
of semantic evaluation in the way required. 
9.4 Imposing fiat boundaries 
If the judging subject has the freedom to impose fiat boundaries in order to delimit 
the vagueness of reference of a certain term, then these delimiting boundaries may 
or may not be imposed upon reality crisply. Consider the approximation-based 
approach to representing vagueness underlying our treatment of sentence [F] (‘We 
will cross the boundary of Mount Everest within the next hour’). In this case the 
judging subject has the authority to impose a (new, transient) boundary that limits 
the extent of the vagueness of the term ‘Everest’. Consider the left part of Figure 4, 
depicting the boundary imposed by a subject who makes a judgment by using the 
sentence [F]. Since [F] is judged in a specific spato-temporal location, there is no 
vagueness in reference to the imposed fiat exterior boundary. The spatio-temporal 
location of the judging subject now is perfectly crisp. 
In most normal cases however the end-boundary of the time-interval will not be 
taken to to impose a crisp boundary. Rather, in most contexts and for most judging 
subjects the intended meaning of [F] is better captured by the judgment: 
[I] We will cross the boundary of Mount Everest in the next    
               hour or so. 
This judgment is obviously subject to higher-order vagueness in the sense that there 
is a multitude of admissible candidate referents for ‘in the next hour or so’. Yet the 
judgment has a determinate truth-value nonetheless. This is because, as we saw, the 
vagueness of the approximation does not allow us to construct cases that give raise 
to truth-value indeterminacy. 
The higher-order vagueness presented in cases such as [I] is restricted in the 
sense that the degree of vagueness of the interval boundaries does not exceed the 
degree of vagueness of the boundaries of the underlying objects. For example, [I] 
cannot be used by a judging subject in order to project onto reality in such a way 
that among the admissible boundary-candidates there will be included some which 
can be crossed only after several hours of travel. This means that reference-frame-
boundaries delimiting vagueness must be (much) crisper than the boundaries whose 
vagueness they delimit, i.e., the degree of vagueness of the reference-frame 
delimiting boundaries (‘one hour or so’) must be (significantly) less than the degree 
of vagueness of the object boundaries (in the case the boundaries of the mountain) to 
which reference is made. From this it follows that if we assume that in naturally 
occurring contexts the delimiting of vagueness of object boundaries which is 
effected by using crisp boundaries does not cause truth-value indeterminacy, then in 
those same contexts higher-order vagueness cannot cause truth-value indeterminacy 
either. 
10. Judgments, vagueness, and approximation 
Given that judging subjects are (in certain contexts) able to impose boundaries onto 
reality (to re-use boundaries already existing in reality) in order to delimit the 
vagueness of their acts of reference, then we need to define in a formal manner what 
this means from the perspective of the semantic theorist who employs a 
supervaluationist framework. In order to do so we first define the notion of 
approximating judgments of which a judgment like [F] ‘We will cross the boundary 
of Mount Everest within the next hour’, is a specific instance. Second, we discuss 
the relationship between the underlying supervaluationist semantic of vague names 
like ‘Everest’ and the vagueness-limiting boundaries imposed by approximating 
judgments like [F]. Thirdly, we define truth-conditions for approximating 
judgments. 
10.1 Approximating judgments 
Approximating judgments are judgments like [F] ‘We will cross the boundary of 
Mount Everest within the next hour’, [G] ‘We will cross the boundary of Mount 
Everest not earlier than 60 minutes and not later than 90 minutes from now’, [H] 
‘The path taken by the whales follows the Gulf Stream’, [I]‘We will cross the 
boundary of Mount Everest in the next hour or so’.  
Approximate judgments are a special class of judgments that contain vague 
names which contain in addition a crisp reference to boundaries that delimit this 
vagueness. Consider the approximating judgments [F] and [G]. These judgments are 
vague because they contain the vague name ‘Everest’. They are also approximating 
since they contain the reference to boundaries delimiting the vagueness of the name 
‘Everest’ by referring to boundaries that delimit admissible candidates of reference 
for ‘Everest’: ‘[having a boundary that will be crossed] not earlier than 60 minutes 
and not later than 90 minutes from now’ in [G], or ‘within the next hour’ (i.e., 
between now and 60 minutes from now) in [F]. In this paper we consider 
approximating judgments which contain a single vague name and some reference to 
boundaries delimiting the vagueness of this name. More complex cases are possible 
– for example cases where the reference frame itself involves a certain degree of 
vagueness – but consideration of these is omitted here since their treatment follows 
the same basic pattern.  
From the perspective of the partition theorist an approximating judgment JA, if 
uttered successfully, imposes two partitions onto reality: a vague partition PtV 
representing the supervalutationist semantics of the vague name N and a reference 
partition PtR which delimits the vagueness of reference of N.  
We say that an approximating judgment is a triple JA1 = (S, PtV, PtR), consisting of 
a sentence, S, together with two
 
granular partitions, PtV and PtR. The context of an 
approximating judgment is represented by the two partitions taken together.  
Consider, for example, the approximating judgment JA1 = ([F], PtV, PtR), with the 
sentence [F] containing the vague name ‘Everest’ and the constraint on admissible 
boundaries of admissible candidates of ‘Everest’ being expressed by ‘[having a 
boundary that will be crossed] in the next hour’. The vague name ‘Everest’ imposes 
a vague partition PtV with a corresponding cell labeled ‘Everest’ projecting onto the 
multiplicity of admissible candidate referents of the name ‘Everest’, as indicated in 
Figure 3.  
The judgment [F] (through its ‘in the next hour’ part) also imposes a reference 
partition PtR onto reality as depicted in the left part of Figure 4. Intuitively, this 
reference partition projects onto reality in a way that constrains admissible candidate 
referents for ‘Everest’, i.e., it constrains admissible projections of the cell ‘Everest’ 
in PtV. The latter must be such that they will be crossed by the judging subject 
between now and in one hour. 
Another example of an approximating judgment is JA2 = ([K], PtV, PtR) with the 
sentence:  
[K] The area of bad weather extends over parts of Wyoming, parts  
       of Montana, parts of Utah, and parts of Idaho. 
The corresponding vague partition PtV contains a cell labeled ‘the area of bad 
weather’ projecting onto a multiplicity of admissible candidates. The judgment JA2 
reuses the partition depicted in the right part of Figure 5 as reference partition PR. 
The latter constrains admissible projections of the cell labeled ‘the area of bad 
weather’ in PtV in such a way that each candidate of reference that is targeted by a 
projection Pi of PtV must extend over parts of reality targeted by the cells labeled 
‘Wyoming’, ‘Utah’, ‘Montana’, and ‘Idaho’ in PtR. Moreover PtR implicitly 
constrains admissible projections of the cell ‘the area of bad weather’ in such a way 
that no candidate of reference targeted by a projection Pi of PtV can extend over parts 
of reality targeted by cells of PtR with labels not mentioned in [K]. 
We now continue by giving a formal partition-theoretic definition of reference 
partitions of the sort described. 
10.2 Partition theory and approximation 
The idea behind the theory of approximation is that a (crisp) granular partition can 
be used as a frame of reference (a generalized coordinate frame (Bittner 1997)), 
which allows us to describe the approximate location of objects. The partition-
theoretic notion of approximation is closely related to the notion of approximation 
defined using rough sets (Pawlak 1982). Consider a vague name such as ‘Mount 
Everest’ and the corresponding multiplicity of admissible candidates formed by 
crisp portions of reality in the domain of the Himalayas. Consider another crisp 
partition structuring this same domain but without recognizing any of the candidates 
referred to by the name ‘Everest’ directly. This might be a partition working with 
the boundaries of India, Tibet and Nepal and their constituent provinces, or a 
partition formed by a raster of cells aligned to lines of latitude and longitude (as in 
the right part of Figure 6). Such a reference partition has the power to recognize all 
these admissible candidates indirectly, i.e., without explicitly projecting onto them.  
To see how this works, we introduce the three concepts of full overlap (fo), 
partial overlap (po), and non-overlap (no), concepts which we shall use to generalize 
the notions of projection and location, as follows. Let o be an object that is not 
directly recognized by a given partition and let x be an object that is located at the 
cell z of our partition (the cell z projects onto x). x is, in the cases mentioned, a 
region of space on the surface of the Earth. The constants fo, po, no will now be 
used to measure the degree of coverage of the object x by the object o.  
We call the relation LR(o, z, ω) the rough location of the object o with respect to 
the cell z and the relation PR(z, o, ω) the rough projection of the cell z onto o. In 
both relations the value ω characterizes the degree of overlap of the object targeted 
by the cell z with the actual object o, i.e., it takes the value fo, po, or no. Consider 
the left part of Figure 5. There the relation po holds between all admissible 
candidate referents (BWAi) of ‘the area of bad weather’ and Montana, i.e., ∀i: 
LR(BWAi, Montana, po). The relation no holds between all BWAi and Oregon, i.e., 
∀i: LR(BWAi, Oregon, no).  
We can characterize the relationships between exact and rough location and exact 
and rough projection as follows: 
LR(o, z, fo) ≡ ∀x: L(x, z) → x ≤ o 
PR(z, o, fo) ≡ ∀x: P(z, x) → x ≤ o 
LR(o, z, po) ≡ ∀x: L(x, z) → ∃y: y < x and y ≤ o 
PR(z, o, po) ≡ ∀x: P(z, x) → ∃y: y < x and y ≤ o 
LR(o, z, no) ≡ ∀x: L(x, z) → ¬∃y: y ≤ x and y ≤ o 
PR(z, o, no) ≡ ∀x: P(z, z) → ¬∃y: y ≤ x and y ≤ o 
The notion of rough location gives rise to an equivalence relation in the domain 
of objects with respect to a given reference partition Pt, as follows: 
o1 ≈R o2 ≡ ∀z: LR(z, o1, ω) ↔ LR(z, o2, ω).  
This can be interpreted as meaning that two objects are equivalent with respect to 
the granular partition PtR if and only if they have an identical rough location with 
respect to all cells of this partition. ≈R can thus be interpreted as meaning 
indiscernibility with respect to the frame of reference provided by the partition PtR.  
Consider the left part of Figure 6, which shows the approximation, by means of a 
rectangular frame with two cells, of one transparent ellipsoid region and one gray 
colored region consisting of two separate parts. With respect to the underlying crisp 
partition indicated by the two raster cells, both regions are equivalent: LR(z1, o1, po), 
LR(z1, o2, po), LR(z2, o1, po), LR(z2, o2, po). In order to take into account the 
topological properties of the approximated objects one can either use more 
sophisticated methods of approximation (Bittner and Stell 2000), or one can take 
into account the topological structure of the approximated objects (Randell, Cui et 
al. 1992). In either cases one needs as underlying theory a mereotopology (Varzi 
1994) rather than pure mereology. Both alternatives go beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The equivalence relation ≈R induces equivalence classes of indiscernible objects 
relative to PtR. We write [o1] in order to denote the class of objects that are ≈R-
equivalent to o1. Below we will show that approximating judgments like ([F], PtV, 
PtR) project onto reality in such a way that all admissible candidate referents (e.g., 
pVi(‘Everest’)) are equivalent with respect to some ≈R (e.g., the partition PtR imposed 
by ‘[such that its border can be crossed] in the next hour’). This means that all 
admissible candidates of reference have identical relations to the portions of reality 
onto which the cells of the reference partition project. In this way all admissible 
candidates can be recognized in determinate fashion, albeit indirectly. 
We define a reference partition as a fourtuple, PtR
 
= (A, PR, LR, Ω) where A is a 
cell structure, PR and LR are a rough projection and location relations, and Ω is the 
set of values (fo, po, no), indicating the degrees of overlap distinguished. The 
equivalence relation ≈R is given indirectly by LR and Ω. We demand that the 
following counterparts of MB1R–4R hold for reference partitions: 
MB1R LR(o, z, ω) → PR(z, o, ω) 
MB2R PR(z, o, ω) → LR(o, z, ω) 
MB3R ∀o: (LR(o, z1, ω) and LR(o, z2, ω)) → z1 = z2 
MB4R ∀z: (PR(z, o1, ω) and PR(z, o2, ω)) → o1 ≈Pt o2 
MB3R tells us that if two cells are such that all objects cover the targets of these cells 
in the same way then these cells must be identical. MB4R tells us that if two objects 
have the same relations (fo, po, no) to all cells of a granular partition Pt then the two 




Figure 6: Rough approximation 
Every reference partition PtR has a crisp skeleton PtS = (A, PS, LS). Where PtS is a 
crisp granular partition with the following properties: (1) A is identical to the cell 
structure in PtR; (2) PS is the restriction of PR to triples of the form (z, o, fo) for 
objects o that are recognized directly by single cells z in A; (3) LS is the restriction 
of LR to triples of the form (o, z, fo) for objects o that are recognized directly by 
single cells z in A; (4) PtS satisfies MA1–4, MB1–6+. It is the crisp skeleton of the 
reference partition which actually establishes the frame of reference for the 
approximation, i.e., projects onto the boundaries that delimit vagueness. 
Consider the judgment ‘The area of bad weather extends over parts of Wyoming, 
parts of Montana, parts of Utah, and parts of Idaho’ and the corresponding formal 
structure JA = ([K], PtV, PtR). The crisp skeleton of the reference partition PtR is the 
partition PtS which recognizes the federal states of the US (Figure 5) and establishes 
the frame of reference for the approximation. Consider Figure 4. The crisp skeletons 
of the reference partitions contain the cells ‘core’, ‘exterior’, and ‘where-the-
boundary-candidates-are’ (this cell structure is shared in both cases with the 
reference partition PtR). The crisp projection (PtS) of these cells establishes the 
(interior and exterior) boundaries which limit the vagueness as discussed above. In 
both cases the reference partition (PtR), on the other hand, indirectly recognizes the 
admissible candidate referents. Consequently, the correspondence between the cell 
structure A in reference partitions, PtR, and reality is completely determined by the 
crisp projection and location relations of the underlying crisp skeleton PtS. The 
reference partition is built upon the crisp skeleton, i.e., the frame of reference, 
provided by PtS.  
10.3 Truth for approximating judgments 
Approximate judgments JA are defined by a sentence S containing a vague name N 
and by a frame of reference delimiting the boundary-candidates of the referent of N. 
This results in a structure JA = (S, PtV, PtR) where PtV represents the vagueness of the 
vague name N and PtR represents the frame of reference. In order to be true the 
partitions PtV and PtR must stand in a particular, well-defined relationship to each 
other.  
Truth conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions that need to be satisfied 
for a judgment to be true. The definition of truth conditions for approximating 
judgments is based on the truth conditions for granular partitions and vague 
partitions as defined above. If an approximating judgment has been made (and this 
means: made in such a way that its truth can at least in principle be evaluated by 
speaker and audience), then this means that appropriate partitions PtV and PtR have 
been successfully invoked by the judging subjects involved. These can now be used 
on the level of semantic evaluation to define truth conditions for the corresponding 
judgment.  
Consider again the approximating judgment JA = ([K], PtV, PtR) with [K] = ‘The 
area of bad weather extends over parts of Wyoming, …’. Let PtV be a vague 
partition PtV = (A, PV, LV), representing the vague reference of the name ‘the area of 
bad weather,’ and let PtR be the reference partition, PtR = (A′, PR, LR, Ω), depicted in 
the right part of Figure 5. Both partitions have roughly the same domain, but the cell 
structures A and A′ are completely distinct. We say that PtR approximates the vague 
reference of the name ‘the area of bad weather’ if and only if all admissible 
candidate referents, i.e., all portions of reality carved out by the multiplicity of 
projections of the cell labeled ‘the area of bad weather’ in PtV are equivalent with 
respect to ≈R.  
More generally we can consider approximating judgments such as [K], [G], [F] as 
instances of the general form: 
JA = (S = ‘N stands in relation R1 to N1 ,…, Rn to Nn’ , PtV, PtR).  
Consider judgment [K]: here ‘N’ translates to ‘the area of bad weather’, R1 translates 
to po (extends over parts of), N1 translates to Wyoming, and so on. In the case of 
judgment [F] ‘N’ translates to ‘Everest’, N1 translates to the path the judging subject 
takes ‘in the next hour’, and R1 translates to po.  
In general we say that N is a vague name, N1, …, Nn are crisp names, and the Ri 
range over the relationships fo, po, no. The approximate judgment of the form JA has 
a reference partition PtR, which approximates the multiplicity of admissible referents 
of the vague name N in S in accordance with the vague partition PtV, if and only if 
the following holds:  
I. the labeling λR maps the names N1, … , Nn onto cells z1, …, zn in Pt
R
, i.e., 
(λR(Ni)) = zi 
the labeling λV maps the name N onto the cell z in PtV, i.e., N = (λV –1)(z) 
II. the relations Ri(pV(z), pR(zi)) hold. 
The approximating judgment JA = (S, PtV, PtR) is then true if and only if  
(a) PtR approximates the candidate referents onto which the cell λV(N) 
vaguely projects; 
(b) PtV represents its domain in such a way that MA1–4 and MB1V–6V+ 
hold; 
(c) PtR represents its domain in such a way that MA1–4 and MB1R–6R+ 
hold. 
From this it follows that in a true approximating judgment JA = (S, PtV, PtR) all 
admissible candidate referents of the vague name N in S are equivalent with respect 
to ≈R.  
Consequently, the judgment JA = ([F], PtV, PtR) is true if and only if all boundary 
candidates are crossed within the specified interval. However the underlying notion 
of approximation allows the judging subject to choose the interval generously 
enough to make sure that the boundaries of all admissible candidates are crossed. 
Notice, however, that the judging subject does not have the freedom to make the 
interior boundary arbitrarily small and the exterior boundary arbitrarily large as 
discussed in the section on the relationship between vagueness and approximation 
above. Consider the judgment JA = ([G], PtV, PtR). One can easily verify that this 
judgment comes out true in terms of the truth conditions specified.  
It is important to stress, again, that PtV and PtR are distinct partitions with different 
cell structures, projections and so on. Notice that choosing a raster that is as fine as 
possible for the approximating partition will not necessarily yield a better 
approximation, since the cells forming the boundary approximation must partially 
overlap the union of the boundary locations of the vague partition. However in most 
cases it will be not be too hard to find a partition that absorbs vagueness in the sense 
discussed here. Obviously, good approximations are harder to find than very coarse 
approximations.  
11 Judging subject and approximation 
When analyzing approximating judgments the partition theorist needs to go beyond 
purely semantic considerations. He needs to take the perspective of the judging 
subject into account. In this section we discuss the relationship between judging 
subjects and the reference partitions they utilize. We start by discussing properties of 
reference partitions and their use as frames of reference. Secondly, when uttering an 
approximating judgment judging subjects often have the choice between alternative 
reference partitions, some coarser, some finer, and this represents a new variant of 
the ontological zooming mentioned above. The choice of a particular reference 
partition determines its usability as a frame of reference and the precision of the 
resulting approximation. We will show below that judging subjects often utter 
approximate judgments that approximate as precisely as necessary rather than as 
precisely as possible. Thirdly, we shall see that judging subjects have more effective 
means to determine the truth of vague judgments than would be involved in passing 
through a potentially infinite number of candidate referents in a supervaluationist 
fashion. 
11.1 Reference partitions 
The types of granular partitions that are used as frames of reference, i.e., the crisp 
skeleton of the reference partition, characteristically have the following properties: 
(1) they are relatively stable, i.e., they do not change over time (we can also demand 
that they are specifiable in some easily communicable way); (2) they are 
mereologically monotonic; (3) they do not contain empty cells; (4) the mereological 
sum of the relevant minimal cells is identical to the root cell; and (5) the 
mereological sum of the targets of all partition cells is identical to the domain of the 
partition. Reference partitions are often spatial or temporal in nature. 
The first characteristic property of a reference partition is that it is relatively static 
with respect to the objects to which it relates. This means that (a) the cell structure is 
fixed and that (b) the objects onto which it projects do not change (they are, for 
example, spatial regions tied to the surface of the Earth). Consider the examples in 
Figure 5. The granular partition projecting onto the United States has existed for 
more than one hundred years without significant changes, where each area of bad 
weather changes continuously throughout the course of its (brief) existence. In fact 
Figure 5 itself needs to be considered as a snapshot. (Smith and Brogaard, to appear) 
Due to the relative stability of the reference partition in a case such as this, it 
provides useful information to say that the area of bad weather was located in parts 
of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah at such and such a time. Every child learns 
this reference partition at school, and it is used for all sorts of purposes thereafter 
(Stevens and Coupe 1978). 
Secondly, the crisp skeleton of reference partitions must be mereologically 
monotonic (MB6+) in order to assure that the mereological structure of the 
underlying domain is preserved. 
Thirdly, reference partitions do not have empty cells, i.e., every cell projects onto 
some object. Fourth, reference partitions do not contain ‘empty space’ (in contrast, 
say, to the periodic table, which contains cells kept in reserve to project onto 
elements yet to be discovered. This means that the mereological sum of all minimal 
cells sums up the root cell. Formally we write: 
CF  ∃z, z1,…,zn: Max(z) z = iz)iMin(z+ , 
where the predicates Max and Min hold of the root and minimal cells, respectively, 
of our reference partition and + is the operation of taking mereological sums. (See 
(Bittner and Smith 2001) for details.) 
Fifth, reference partitions are such that the mereological sum of all objects 
located at minimal cells is identical to that onto which the root cell projects. 
Formally we write: 
CE  ∃z, z1,…,zn: Max(z) and p(z) = )p(zi)iMin(z+ , 
where p(z) returns the object onto which z is projected.  
Conditions (3)-(5) ensure that crisp reference partitions are full, exhaustive, and 
complete in the sense of (Smith and Bittner 2001). In this class there fall all spatial 
partitions with minimal cells which sum together to exhaust a certain space. 
Important groups of reference partitions are partitions imposed by quantities of all 
kinds (Johansson 1989, chapter 4); temporal partitions like calendars (Bittner to 
appear), and spatial partitions like political subdivisions or the subdivision of the 
Earth into cells bounded by lines or latitude and longitude.  
11.2 Precision of approximation 
When analyzing approximating judgments it is often not sufficient to determine only 
truth or falsehood but one has to evaluate also the precision involved. We start by 
taking the perspective of the semantic theorist and classify portions of reality in 
terms their relationships to admissible candidate referents of a vague name. 
Afterwards we compare these partitions with reference partitions imposed by 
judging subjects. 
Consider the vague projection of the cell ‘Everest’ as depicted in Figure 3. From 
the perspective of the semantic theorist, we need to take into account the 
corresponding unity condition, which would look like this:  
U5 (1) The summit is part of Mount Everest; (2) if x is part of 
Mount Everest and y is connected to x then y is part of 
Mount Everest if and only if y is part of the projection Pi 
of the cell ‘Everest’. 
For each cell z in a vague partition PtV we can now classify corresponding portions 
of reality into three classes: core parts with respect to z, boundary parts with respect 
to z, and exterior parts with respect to z. 
We say that x is a core part of the object onto which the cell z projects if and only 
if, under all projections P in PV, x is a part of all admissible candidate referents of 
the vague name corresponding to z. In symbols:  
coreV(x, z) ≡∀p ∈ PV: x ≤ p(z) 
Consider, for example, the cell labeled ‘Everest’ in PtV. There are portions of reality 
that are parts of Mount Everest under all projections in PtV, for example, the summit. 
Thus coreV(summit, ‘Everest’). 
x is a boundary part of the object onto which the cell z projects if and only if 
there are some projections in PV under which x satisfies the associated unity 
condition and there are other projections in PV under which x fails to satisfy the 
associated unity condition: 
boundaryV(x, z) ≡ ∃p ∈ PV: x ≤ p(z) and ∃p ∈ PV: ¬(x ≤ p(z)) 
For example, there are portions of reality that are parts of Mount Everest under some 
projections but not under others. 
x is an exterior part of the object onto which the cell z projects if and only if x is 
not reached by any projection of the cell z. 
exteriorV(x, z) ≡ ∀p ∈ PV: ¬(x ≤ p(z)) 
For example, there are parts of reality – such as Berlin – that are not reached by any 
of the projections of the cell ‘Everest’ in any natural context. 
Consequently, from the semantic perspective every vague name creates a 
partition of reality into core, boundary, and exterior parts. We define the semantic 
partitioning of reality with respect to a vague name N to be a partitioning of this sort 
generated in reflection of the vagueness of N.  
In order to evaluate the precision of a true approximating judgment, we now need 
to consider the deviation of the location of two pairs of boundaries: (a) the interior 
and exterior boundaries imposed by the judging subject as a frame of reference for 
her approximation; and (b) the boundaries imposed by the semantic partitioning. 
Consider, again, the approximating judgment JA = ([F], PtV, PtR). The reference 
partition PtR (shown in the left part of Figure 4) is a special instance of the class of 
reference partitions that impose two fiat boundaries onto reality: an interior 
boundary of the approximation and an exterior boundary of the approximation. As 
discussed above, this often results in a partition structure similar to the one depicted 
in the right part of Figure 4. The (geometric) projection of this partition onto the 
path the judging subject takes on her journey towards the summit of Mount Everest 
results in the reference partition shown in the left part of Figure 4.  
In more complex reference partitions, like the political subdivision of the US 
used in judgment [K] (Figure 5), the interior boundary of the approximation 
coincides with the boundary of the mereological sum of targets of partition cells for 
which the relation fo holds (e.g., the boundary of the cell K in the middle of Figure 
6). The exterior boundary of the approximation coincides with the boundary of the 
mereological sum of targets of partition cells for which the relation po holds (e.g., 
the outer boundary of the mereological sum of the cells [A,…, P] minus the cells A 
and M in the middle of the figure). This corresponds to the boundaries of the 
mereological sums of the lower and upper approximations in the sense of rough set 
theory (Pawlak 1982).  
 We say that an approximation is precise for the name N if and only if (1) the 
interior boundary of the approximation coincides with the boundary separating the 
core from the surrounding parts of the semantic partitioning; and (2) the exterior 
boundary of the approximation coincides with the boundary separating exterior parts 
from what lies within. A true approximating judgment is otherwise imprecise.  
Due to the nature of vagueness most approximations will be imprecise. 
Moreover, as discussed above in our section on degrees of vagueness and crispness, 
judging subjects will utter approximating judgments which are as precise as 
necessary in the given context. This means that the limits imposed on v agueness 
will be such that, for the class of objects in the foreground of the judger’s attentions, 
only judgments with determinate truth-values can be made, for example judgments 
about the tables or ashtrays relative to the smoking zone as discussed in our example 
[C].  
11.3 Determining the truth of judgments 
The partition theorist holds that judging subjects use approximations in order to 
formulate judgments which truth-value can be determined more easily than going 
through all the (potentially infinite) candidates of vague reference in a 
supervaluationist fashion. To see this, consider the vague reference of the name 
‘Everest’. Within a certain range there are arbitrarily many, indeed infinitely many, 
admissible candidates of reference. When making a judgment about Mount Everest 
a finite being like a human judging subject cannot go through all these infinite 
candidate referents in order to determine the truth-value of the judgment in a 
supervaluationist fashion. Consequently more effective cognitive means need to be 
at work.  
In order to see how approximations fit into the picture, consider the definition of 
the truth of an approximating judgment: An approximating judgment JA = (S, PtV, 
PtR) with the vague name N is S is true if and only if the partitions PtV and PtR 
project in a structure preserving manner onto reality (MA1−4, MB1V−6V and 
MB1R−4R hold) and all admissible candidates of reference of N (projected onto 
reality by PtV) are equivalent with respect to the approximation dictated by PtR.  
An important point is that the above definition does not specify that the 
approximation is precise. On the other hand, the conceptual structure underlying 
vague names such as ‘Everest’ or ‘area of bad weather’ is such that it provides a 
(vague) unity condition which ensures that admissible candidate referents are not 
arbitrarily scattered mereological wholes. These two aspects give the judging subject 
the power to place vagueness-delimiting boundaries in such a way that she does not 
need to go through all admissible candidates in order to determine the truth of an 
approximating judgment. All the judging subject has to check is whether or not the 
judgment is true regarding the limiting boundaries, and she has the freedom to 
choose a degree of precision most convenient for her purposes. Thus she can place 
the boundaries in ‘safe’ places, i.e., in places that are such that the truth or falsehood 
of the judgment can be determined easily for these boundaries and without 
indeterminacy.  
Consider the approximating judgment [G]: ‘We will cross the boundary of Mount 
Everest in the next hour’. [G] can be uttered seriously only in contexts where the 
judging subject has means to determine that the boundary to Mount Everest has not 
yet been crossed. After one hour the judging subject checks again and will come to 
the result that the judgment was either true or false. During this hour the judging 
subject might have checked occasionally whether or not the boundary has been 
crossed already, but she certainly does not go through infinitely many candidates of 
reference while heading uphill.  
12. Conclusions 
In this paper we proposed an application of the theory of granular partitions to the 
phenomenon of vagueness, a phenomenon which is itself seen as a semantic 
property of names and predicates. We defended a supervaluationistic theory of the 
underlying semantics, but we argued that it is insufficient to consider the vagueness 
of names and predicates in a context-free fashion. Rather vague names and 
predicates must be evaluated as they appear within judgments actually made in 
natural contexts. We then argued that judgments add context to sentences in a way 
that helps to resolve the dilemma posed by vagueness. Note that this does not mean 
that vagueness is somehow eliminated. Vague names and predicates are still as 
vague as they always were. Rather, we showed that the framework of granular 
partitions can provide the framework for understanding how, in real-world contexts, 
judgments with indeterminate truth-values are systematically avoided. We also 
showed that the use of frames of reference in making approximating judgments can 
be formulated very naturally in partition-theoretic terms, and that the framework of 
granular partitions then helps us to understand the relationships between vagueness 
and approximation.  
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